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Joel Fichaud*

Analysis of the Charter and
Its Application to Labour Law

This paper: (1) lists the provisions of the Charterof Rights and
Freedoms1 which may have relevance to labour law; (2) suggests a
possible framework for analysis of the provisions, and; (3) applies
the provisions and analysis to aspects of labour law.
I. Provisionsof Charter
1. Application of Charter
Section 32(1) states that the Charter applies to Parliament, the
legislatures and to the federal and provincial governments. The
question remains whether the actions of a private person or
organization, not under the aegis of government or authority of
legislation, may be challenged for violation of the Charter. Section
32 is under the title "Application of Charter", and likely will be
interpreted to impliedly exclude application to private actions not
pursuant to legislation.
On the other hand, s. 52(1) states that the Charter is the
"supreme law of Canada," s. 1 affirmatively "guarantees" the
rights and freedoms, and ss. 2-15 affirmatively grant the rights
variously to "everyone," "every" citizen or permanent resident or
"every" individual. There is no express exclusion of the Charter's
application to actions of private individuals or organizations.
2. Substantive Rights and Freedoms
The following substantive rights and freedoms guaranteed by the
Charter may have bearing on labour law. The preamble recognizes
"the rule of law." Section 2 accords to everyone the fundamental
freedoms of: "conscience and religion"; "thought, belief, opinion
and expression including freedom of the press and other media of
communication"; "peaceful assembly"; and "association." Section 6(2) accords to every citizen and permanent resident the right to
*LL.B. (Dalhousie, 1975), LL.M. (Harvard, 1976) of the Nova Scotia Bar. This
paper represents the case law as of May, 1983.
1. CanadaAct, 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
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move to any province and to "pursue the gaining of a livelihood in
any province. "
Section 7 accords to everyone the right to "life, liberty and
security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except
in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice." Section
15(1) states:
Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the
right to the equal protection and benefit of the law without
discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on
race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or
mental or physical disability.
By s. 32(2) this provision will not come into force until 1985.
The CanadaAct describes other democratic, legal, and language
rights which should not have direct bearing on labour law. By s. 26,
the guarantee of rights by the Charterdoes not deny the existence of
other rights and freedoms which exist outside the Charter.
3. Limitationson the Substantive Rights and Freedoms
The only limitations upon these substantive rights and freedoms are
by express legislative exclusion under s. 33 or judicial interpretation
under s. 1.
Section 33 authorizes Parliament or a legislature to expressly
state in a statute that the statute shall operate notwithstanding the
following sections of the Charter: s. 2 (fundamental freedoms), ss.
7-14 (legal rights) or s. 15 (equality). The legislative exclusion will
expire unless re-enacted after five years. By s. 28, the legislative
exclusion may not interfere with sexual equality. Section 1
authorizes a court to restrict the rights and freedoms to "such
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified
in a free and a democratic society."
4. Consequences of Contraventionof Charter
If an individual has suffered interference with his substantive rights
or freedoms guaranteed by the Charter,and if the interference is not
justified under ss. 1 or 33, what are the consequences? By s. 52(1),
any law inconsistent with the guaranteed right or freedom is of no
force or effect. So no tribunal or other authority could apply,
exercise or enforce the law. Section 32(1) states that the Charter
applies to the Parliament, the legislatures and federal and provincial
governments. So a governmental action which contravenes the
guaranteed right or freedom may be challenged.
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By s. 24(1) "anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by
the Charter, have been infringed or denied" may apply to a court
for such remedy as the court considers appropriate. By s. 24(2) this
may include exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the
Charterif admission "would bring the administration of justice into
disrepute."
II. Framework ofAnalysis of Charter
1. Effect ofInterpretationof CanadianBill of Rights
The courts have restrictively interpreted wording in the Canadian
Bill of Rights that is quite similar to the guarantees in the Charter.
The Canadian Bill of Rights2 is a statute, and was interpreted
restrictively because it was not constitutionally entrenched. In Curr
v. Queen3 , Laskin, J. stated:
Assuming that 'except by due process of law' provides a means
of controlling substantive federal legislation-a point that did not
directly arise in R. v. Drybones-compelling reasons ought to be
advanced to justify the Court in this case to employ a statutory (as
contrasted with a constitutional) jurisdiction to deny operative
effect to a substantive measure duly enacted by a Parliament
constitutionally competent to do so, and exercising its powers in
accordance with the tenets of responsible government which
underlie the discharge of legislative authority under the British
North America Act 1867. These reasons must be related to
objective and manageable standards by which a Court should be
guided if scope is to be found in s. l(a) due process, to silence
4
otherwise competent federal legislation.
This statement has been applied repeatedly to limit the
interpretation of the "due process" phrase in s. l(a) of the Bill of
6
Rights, 5 the guarantee of "equality before the law" under s. l(b)
and fundamental freedoms such as freedom of speech in s. 1(d). 7
2. The CanadianBill of Rights, S.C. 1960. c. 44 (see also R.S.C. 1970, Appendix
111.).
3. (1972), 26 D.L.R. (3d) 603 (S.C.C.).
4. Id., at 613-14.
5. R. v. Morgentaler(1975), 4 N.R. 277 (S.C.C.), at 323-24.
6. R. v. Burnshine (1974), 2 N.R. 53 (S.C.C.) at 66; Bliss v. A.G. Canada
(1978), 23 N.R. 527 (S.C.C.) at 536-27; Marchak v. A.G. Canada(1980), 116
D.L.R. (3d) 397 (F.C.A.), affirming (1980), 102 D.L.R. (3d) 745 (F.C.T.D.) at
753.
7. Gordon and Gotch Canada Ltd v. Minister of National Revenue (1978), 20

N.R. 467 (F.C.A.) at 472-73.
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The consequences of this restrictive interpretation have been most
apparent respecting the guarantee of "equality before the law" in s.
l(b). Under the guarantee of "equal protection of the laws" in the
14th amendment of the American Constitution, courts have struck
down legislation or state action which discriminates against
individuals on the basis of factors which the judges consider to be
invidious according to judically-determined standards external to
the legislation. Canadian courts, on the other hand, have stated that
"equality before the law" in s. 1(b) is satisfied if the federal
legislation is enacted for a "valid federal objective," interpreted to
mean virtually any objective which is intra vires under s. 91 of the
British North America Act s (hereafter the B.N.A. Act) (now
Constitution Act, 1867). Legislation which discriminates against
Indians satisfied "equality before the law" because Parliament has
constitutional jurisdiction to legislate respecting "Indians" under s.
91(24) of the B.N.A. Act. 9
There have been several exceptions where judges have applied
standards external to the legislation in order to test whether the
legislation satisfies the standard of "equality before the law" in s.
l(b). 10 The weight of authority, however, has reduced the
determination a question-begging exercise. However the statute
discriminates, there is "equality before the law" if the statute was
enacted for a "valid federal objective", being almost anything
within federal legislative jurisdiction.
The courts understandably have been reluctant to use a statutory
bill of rights to strike down intra vires legislation. The
entrenchment of the Charter should remove this inhibition.
Legislation must now be reviewed on substantive grounds according
to standards external to the statute. The rationale for the approach
under the Canadian Bill of Rights no longer exists. The courts
should start afresh their analysis of the entrenched Charter, and the

8. R. v. Burnshine (1974), 2 N.R. 53 (S.C.C.) at 66; Prata v. Minister of
Manpower and Immigration (1975), 3 N.R. 484 (S.C.C.); Bliss v. A.G. Canada
(1978), 23 N.R. 537 (S.C.C.) at 536-37; R. v. McKay (1980), 33 N.R. 1 (S.C.C.)
at 7-8; Marchak v. A.G. Canada(1980), 116 D.L.R. (3d) 397 (F.C.A.), affirming
(1980), 102 D.L.R. (3d) 745 (F.C.T.D.) at 759.
9. Canard Estate v. A.G. Canada (1975), 4 N.R. 91 (S.C.C.) at 109, 117-18;
A.G. Canada v.Lavell (1973), at 38 D.L.R. (3d) 481 (S.C.C.) 489.
10. R. v. Drybones, [1970] S.C.R. 282;R. v. McKay (1980), 33 N.R. I (S.C.C.)
at 21-3, per McIntyre, J. concurring; Bliss v. A.G. Canada (1977), 16 N.R. 254
(F.C.A.)per Pratte, J., affirmed (1978), 23 N.R. 527 (S.C.C.).
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jurisprudence under the Canadian Bill of Rights should have
minimal precendential value. The early case law under the Charter
indicates that the courts may take this approach."
2. Legitimacy ofJudicalRole under the Charter
Under the Charter, the court must determine whether statutory
provisions or policy-based decisions of government should be
struck down on substantive grounds. While challenging the political
expression of the government, the court will remain a judicial body.
The legislature and executive control finances and law enforcement.
The court relies for these functions upon government, and indirectly
upon respect for the judiciary by the government's popular
constituency. Further, the court relies directly upon respect of the
people and governments for the voluntary compliance with its
judgments necessary for effective operation of the judicial system.
The legislature and executive find legitimacy for their political
decisions in the electoral consent of the people. A tenured judge has
no constituency or electoral process to justify political decisions.
Without some accepted objective standard from which to reason a
judge under a bill of rights would be in an impossible position: he
would have to know better than the people know themselves, and to
make political decisions better than the politicians. These political
decisions would vary from judge to judge and from time to time.
Collegiality in a court would be most difficult to maintain.
Political whim may be appropriate for a legislature. Popular
dissatisfaction is directed more to the incumbent politicians than to
the legislative system. An election is the outlet. Popular
dissatisfaction with judicial decisions has no outlet except disrespect
for the judicial system, which impairs the effectiveness of the
judiciary.
Several commentators have considered this question and
concluded that the court under a bill of rights should base its
judgment on a foundation of "legitimacy. ' 1 2 This means that the
Court must exercise its judgment according to standards other than
the political opinions of the judge, namely objective standards
11. R. v. Pugsley (1982), 55 N.S.R. (2d) 163 (S.C.A.D.) at 166; Re Section 94(2)
of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.C.S., February 3, 1983); Re Skapinker (O.C.A.),
January 27, 1983.
12. See Cox, The Role of the Supreme Court in American Government (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1976).
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which command popular respect. Popular consent is essential for a
legislature; popular respect is essential in the long run for a court.
This has not always been easy. In the early decades of this
century, the American courts struck down legislation which
redistributed wealth as supposedly violating "due process of law"
under the 5th and 14th Amendments. By the time of the Great
Depression, people questioned the right of the Supreme Court to act
as a supra-legislature. The Court had overreached its "legitimacy."
President Roosevelt threatened to pack the Supreme Court with
New Deal sympathizers. Judicial reasoning began to reflect the
popular views, and substantive due process abated.
How then to achieve "legitimacy" under the Canadian Charter?
The answer is not for the court to avoid the functions of review
commanded by the Charter. To interpret the Charteras restrictively
as the courts treated the Canadian Bill of Rights would be as
"illegitimate" within the above meaning as excessive intervention.
The Court would be seen as an appellate legislature repealing
individual rights guaranteed and entrenched in a popularly
supported and validly enacted constitution.
The American experience with substantive due process is perhaps
a lesson in "legitimacy." The court if possible should avoid basing
its judgment upon principles which may change with shifts in
popular outlook and political circumstances. Rather, the court
should base its judgment upon objective and permanent standards.
This will only take the court part of the way. It must then deduce
from the constitutional postulates in a manner unlike the inductive
reasoning of the common law.
Euclidian deduction will be simpler in theory than in practice.
Value-laden judgments will be inevitable. In Canada though,
objectivity for the standards will be more accessible than in the
United States. Section 1 of the Canadian Charter entrenches broad
principles which define the limits of all the guaranteed rights and
freedoms. A judge may draw his postulates from s. 1 instead of his
personal view of natural law. The development of a balanced and
coherent philosophy under s. 1 will be important for the legitimacy
of the judicial role under the Charter.
3. Section I of the Charter
Section 1 of the Charter guarantees the rights and freedoms
"subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be
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demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society". Each time
a court invokes one of the fights or freedoms, the court must
determine whether the infringement is justified under s. 1.
13
The Victoria Charter, 1971, Article 3 stated:
Nothing in this Part shall be construed as preventing such
limitations on the exercise of the fundamental freedoms as are
reasonably justifiable in a democratic society in the interests of
public safety, order, health or morals, of national security, or of
the fights and freedoms of others, whether imposed by the
Parliament of Canada or the legislature of the Province, within
the limits of their respective legislative powers, or by the
construction or application of any law.
The Final Report of The Special Joint Committee of the Senate
and the House of Commons on the Constitution of Canada,' 4 1972,
Recommendation 21, stated:
The rights and freedoms recognized by the Bill of Rights should
not be interpreted as absolute and unlimited, but should rather be
exercisable to the extent that they are reasonably justifiable in a
democratic society.
The proposed Constitutional Resolution of October, 1980 stated:
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the
rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable
limits as are generally accepted in a free and democratic society
with a parliamentary system of government.
The Special Joint Committee substituted the present wording of s. 1
by an amendment of January 22, 1981.
The Charter retained the basic test of the Joint Committee of
1972 with the addition of the requirements that the limitations be
''prescribed by law" and be "demonstrably" justified in a "free"
as well as a democratic society.
Under s. 1 of the Charter, the infringement is justified if (1) the
infringement is prescribed by law and is (2) demonstrably (3) a
reasonable limit in a "free and democratic society".
The first condition raises the question to what extent an
infringement may be prescribed by common law or subordinate
legislation. Sections 1 and 52(1) each refer to "law". It may be
argued that whether the reference to "law" includes common law
13. Canadian Constitutional Charter, 1971 (Victoria Charter, 1971) Article 3 in
ConstitutionalConference Proceedings(June 14, 1971) at 52.
14. Can. The Special Joint Committee of the Senate andof the House of Commons
on the Constitutionof Canada(Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1972) at 18.
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should be considered in the same manner under both sections. The
Ontario Divisional Court has stated that limits whose standards are
left to the unbridled discretion of a tribunal are not "prescribed by
law".15
The second condition probably means that the onus to show the
existence of the other conditions is upon the party who seeks to
justify the infringement.
The third condition requires more analysis. It could be argued
that any infringement prescribed by statute is justifiable in a
"democratic" society. The additions of the Charter to the
formulation of the Joint Committee make clear that an infringement
will not be justified merely because it is prescribed in a
democratically enacted statute. This is because: (1) the requirement
that the infringement be prescribed by law is stated elsewhere, and a
repetition of this test would be tautological; (2) the infringement
must be justified in a "free" as well as a democratic society; (3) the
infringement must be "reasonable" which implies an objective
standard external to the challenged statute, and; (4) the interpretation would renders. 52(1) meaningless.
On the other hand, s. 1 clearly contemplates some restrictions
upon the unbridled rights and freedoms in the Charter.Total license
to disobey the laws of the legislative majority is "free" but not
"democratic." Section 1 makes sense only if the words "free" and
"democratic" are interpreted to be mutually consistent. This
affords a theoretical framework. The word "democratic" invokes
the ideal against which to measure the actual. An ideal democracy
draws its sustenance from the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the
Charter. The Committee on the Constitution of the Canadian Bar
Association' 6 stated:
A more particularized objection is that a Bill of Rights offends
against the doctrine of the supremacy of Parliament. While this is
true to a degree, that doctrine combined with a Bill of Rights can
be seen as naturally supportive of the democratic system.
A democracy is the basis and prerequisite for the operation of
the supremacy of Parliament. That being so, it would seem
justifiable to entrench in a Constitution principles which are
prerequisite to the existence of democracy. Democracy is the
periodic determination of the common will by the free expression
of the genuine and informed will of the individual. There must be
15. Re. The TheatresAct (0. Div. Ct.), March 25, 1983.
16. Towards a New Canada, (Montreal: Canadian Bar Foundation, 1978).
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freedom of thought, conscience and opinion, or there can be no
expression of the genuine will of the individual. There must be
freedom of information, assembly and association, or there can
be no expression of an informed will of the individual. There
must be freedom of speech, or there can be no "expression" of
the will of the individual at all. There must be universal suffrage
and free elections, representation by population and required
sittings and elections of legislative institutions, or there can be no
'expression of the common will'. The right to privacy is a
prerequisite to freedom of speech, expression, thought, conscience, opinion, assembly and association. It is inconsistent to
guarantee these rights directly when a person's knowledge that
his privacy may be violated will indirectly inhibit the exercise of
the guaranteed rights. All the above rights are prerequisite to the
proper exercise of democracy, which in turn is a prerequisite to
the proper operation of the principle of the supremacy of
Parliament. There is, therefore, no conflict between the
entrenchment of these rights and the principle of the supremacy
of Parliament.
Supremacy of Parliament means supremacy to create law. Law
will only operate effectively if it is enforced by an impartial
tribunal after giving all sides equal opportunity to present factual
and legal arguments. It is therefore a prerequisite to the proper
operation of the principle of the supremacy of Parliament that the
courts apply principles of natural and fundamental justice.'
Under this model, interference with the fundamental freedoms in
s. 2 would not be justified in a free and democratic society to the
extent that these freedoms nourish ideal democratic principles and
foster the determination of truth as the premise of ideal democracy.
Infringement. with legal rights guaranteeing fundamental justice
would not be justified insofar as the legal rights ensure that the
tribunal accurately determines and applies the facts and law as
intended by the ideal legislature and presumably the actual
legislature.
An element of ideal democracy is a safeguard against undue
oppression of the minority by the majority. This applies whether the
regime is a corporation, bargaining unit or political unit. Certain
discriminatory actions or classifications inherently may be without
legitimate purpose. By s. 15(1) every individual is equal before and
under the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the
law "without discrimination." Race, nationality, and sex are
examples of illegitimate classifications, but are not exclusive. The
courts will have to determine what other actions or classifications
17. Id., at 16.
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are inherently illegitimate in an ideal democracy which protects the
minority against undue oppression by the majority. To that extent
infringement of the Equality Rights would not be justifiable under s.
1.
The theory of the Charterwould be to ensure that the organs of
government conform as closely as possible to the model of ideal
democracy. Beyond this, the control of government would be left to
political rather than judicial review, and the protection of rights and
freedoms would be left to statutory human rights codes. This
approach would not be entirely consistent with the American
approach. The American Bill of Rights and its interpretation owe
much to the philosophy of John Locke. 18 Locke felt that rights and
freedoms belonged naturally to individuals without government.
Government could not create rights, but further to the social
contract among individuals could act only as a fiduciary to better
guard the rights and freedoms of the individuals. So, an individual
may enjoy and enforce the fundamental rights not specified in the
Bill of Rights, a principle implicit in the American 9th Amendment.
A corollary is that the rights and freedoms may take a life of their
own and may not necessarily be restricted to the limits necessary to
ensure the effective operation of democratic government. Thus
American courts have found entrenched rights such as the right to
privacy unspecified in the constitution but embedded in the
"penumbra" of the Bill of Rights.
Section 26 of the Charter is similar to the American 9th
Amendment and may well provide a basis for an argument that
constitutional guarantees of Canadians be interpreted as broadly as
in the United States. But with Canada's traditions of supremacy of
parliament and reduced emphasis on sovereignty of the individual,
the word "democratic" in s. 1 might be interpreted to delimit
"free" instead of the reverse. If so, it is hoped that the courts
interpret "democratic" as the ideal not the actual. This would
exclude the notion prevalent under the CanadianBill of Rights that a
statute democratically enacted is beyond review.
Most of the cases under the Charter have not analysed s. 1 in
depth or with precision. In Quebec Association of ProtestantSchool
Boards v. A. G. Quebec19 , Chief Justice Deschenes analysed s. 1
differently than suggested above. His Lordship stated that: (i) the
18. Locke, Second Treatise on Civil Government (London: George Routledge,
1903).
19. (1982), 140 D.L.R. (3d) 33 (Q.S.C.) at 53-89.
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party seeking to limit the fundamental right or freedom has the onus
to prove all the elements of s. 1; (ii) the limit must be prescribed by
"law"; (iii) the limit must be "reasonable" and; (iv) the limit must
exist in a "free and democratic society". Chief Justice Deschenes
considered items (iii) and (iv) separately. He found that Quebec
society was "free and democratic" which satisfied condition (iii).
He stated that a limit would be "reasonable" if it was "a
proportionate means to attain the purpose of the legislation." The
difficulty with this pattern of analysis is that it may well be argued
that the purpose of an enactment is to do no less than what the
enactment says. The Court would either apply a question-begging
test similar to the "valid federal objective" under the CanadianBill
of Rights, or would engage in policy review without an objective
standard to gauge whether the words of the enactment are
disproportionate to its purpose. A statute whose purpose is to
infringe a guaranteed right or freedom would be justified under
section 1.
III. Applicationto LabourLaw
To a considerable degree, the application of the Charter to labour
law involves the management of reformulation of familiar concepts.
The hard decisions will be to determine the effects of constitional
entrenchment of these concepts.
1. Application of the Charter
A fair argument can be made that the Charterapplies to all disputes,
including those between private individuals unrelated to statute or
government action. Under s. 52(1) the Charteris the "supreme law
of Canada" and any inconsistent law is of "no force and effect."
So, the Charter could prevail over common law as well as statute,
and a private law suit could draw from the Charterto the extent that
it is inconsistent with common law principles. But s. 32(1) of the
Charter applies to the federal and provincial governments, and
might arguably affect execution by government action on a private
judgment.
It is more likely that the Charter will be limited to government
and legislative action. These limits are expressed in s. 32(1), and
are consistent with the possible interpretation of s. 1 to guarantee
only those rights and freedoms needed for ideal democratic
government.

Analysis of the Charter and Its Application to Labour Law 413
Actions of government as employer should be fully susceptible to
challenge for breach of the guarantees in the Charter. Quasigovernmental organizations such as publicly-funded universities or
hospitals, or activities which depend on a high degree of
government intervention may be similarly affected. American
courts have held that functions of state universities may be "state
action" subject to the Bill of Rights.
The application of the Charter through legislation raises many
interesting questions. Certain unions in the public sector are
incorporated by private statute. It may be argued that the actions of
the union exist because of the legislation and may be challenged for
breach of the Charter. It may as reasonably be argued that the
actions of any corporation incorporated under companies legislation
may be challenged. These propositions might stretch the principle
too far.
A strong argument can be made that the bargaining and
enforcement functions of a union certified as exclusive bargaining
representatives under general provincial labour relations legislation
are subject to the Charter. American courts have accepted this
argument, at least under The Railway Labour Act. 20 In Michaels v.
Red Deer College2 ' Chief Justice Laskin appeared unsympathetic to
a similar argument. Nonetheless, as certified bargaining agent, the
union may bind employees in the unit to a collective agreement and
may make decisions respecting the enforcement of that agreement,
against the will or interests of particular individuals within the unit.
The trade union legislation requires the employee to accept the
certified union as his exclusive bargaining agent, obligates the
employer to bargain in good faith, provides that the collective
agreement binds the employee, and specifies the method of
settlement of disputes under the collective agreement by arbitration
or otherwise. If the union negotiates or enforces the agreement in a
manner which deprives an individual in the unit of a right or
freedom guaranteed by the Charter, the employee might reasonably
say that his right or freedom is denied because of the authority
vested in the union under the trade union legislation. The union's
action might be challenged for violation of the Charter. If the
statute could not deprive the individual of his right or freedom
20. Railway Employees v. Hanson (1956), 391 U.S. 225. IMA v. Street (1961),
367 U.S. 740. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. (1944), 323 U.S. 192.

21. (1975), 5 N.R. 99 (S.C.C.) at 118.
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directly, then presumably the statute could not authorize an
intermediary to deprive the individual against his will. The Ontario
Labour Relations Board has ruled that, as a statutory tribunal bound
by statutory standards, it will apply the Charter to labour relations in
22
the private sector.
The question may arise whether arbitration under a collective
agreement is subject to the prescriptions of the Charter. Again, the
arbitration clause of the agreement binds the employee because of
the trade union legislation. Some statutes require arbitration, while
others require final settlement by arbitration or "otherwise."
Arbitration is often the required method in the construction
industry. Arbitration awards are enforceable according to arbitration
statutes. A reasonable argument could be made that the arbitration
award sufficiently depends on the legislation to subject the
proceedings to the Charter.
Even if the Charter may apply under s. 32(1) to various aspects
of the negotiation and enforcement of collective agreements, the
subjection of the individual to the group interest under the trade
union act legislation may be protected as a justifiable limitation in a
free and democratic society under s. 1.
It is difficult to see how internal union action may be subjected to
the Charter. Trade union legislation may give the union legal status
for purposes of litigation, negotiation, or enforcement of collective
agreements. 23 It is the union's constitution and by-laws which
authorize most internal action, such as discipline. Neither
government action nor legislation establishes the union's constitution or by-laws. A union whose constitution discriminates racially
or denies a fundamental freedom may suffer under human rights
legislation or before the Labour Relations Board. Unless the courts
extend the application of the Charter beyond s. 32(1), it is unlikely
that such action may be challenged constitutionally.

22. InternationalLadies Garment Workers Union & ThirdDimension Manufacturing Limited (1983), 83 C.L.L.C. 16.022 at pp. 14.200-14.202.
23. Teamsters v. Therien, [1960] S.C.R. 256; O'Laughlin v. Halifax
Longshoremen's Association (1978), 28 D.L.R. (3d) 315 (N.S.S.C.A.D.);
Maritime Employers' Association v. International Longshoremen's Association

(1978), 3 N.R. 386 (S.C.C.).
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2. Freedom ofAssociation
The premise of labour relations legislation is the association of
individual workers to equalize their bargaining power against an
employer whose resources usually comprise a concentration of
capital or an association of shareholders. The guarantee of freedom
of association in s. 2(d) of the Charter should protect the
fundamental rights of employees to organize, at least without
interference from government or private persons acting under the
authority of legislation. American courts have struck down
ordinances which require licenses before union organizers could
solicit members and legislation which prohibits public sector
employees from joining unions. Anti-union discrimination by
government employers might give the employee a constitutional
cause of action under the Charter. The Ontario Labour Relations
Board has held that a statue which interferes with collective
bargaining but not with the employees' choice of a bargaining agent
24
does not infringe upon freedom of association under the Charter.
Unless the courts apply the Charter to non-governmental action,
interference with unionization by private employers should not have
constitutional implications.
Unions may find that freedom of association is a double-edged
sword. It has been argued that the necessary concomitant of
freedom to associate is freedom not to associate. An employee is
only free to associate when he has a choice. So, employees may
have a constitutionally protected right to abstain from joining a
union. Freedom of association in the Irish, West German and Indian
constitutions has been interpreted to imply a right of the individual
to disassociate from a union. 25 Similar challenges have been
attempted but have failed under the implied freedom of association
in the American 1st Amendment. The American courts have upheld
the union security provisions, but have placed some restrictions on a
union's spending of compulsory check-off funds for political
purposes against the will of individual employees. 2 6
24. Service Employees Union v. Broadway Manor Nursing Home (1983), 83
C.L.L.C. 16.019 at pp. 14.177-8.
25. See A. Staines, ConstitutionalProtection and the European Convention on
Human Rights -An Irish Joke? (1981), 44 Mod. Law Rev. 149; J. Casey, Some
Implicationsof Freedom of Associationin LabourLaw: A ComparativeSurvey with
Special Reference to Ireland(1972), 21 Int'l and Comp. L.Q. 699.
26. Railway Employees v. Hanson (1956), 351 U.S. 225; IMA v. Street (1961),
367 U.S. 740;Abood v. DetroitBoardofEducation (1977), 431 U.S. 209.
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Union security provisions, either maintaining union membership
as a condition of employment or mandatory check-off, are
authorized by most collective agreements and by provincial trade
union legislation. The Canadian courts will probably determine one
day whether the Charter guarantees a freedom of "nonassociation" which protects an employee dismissed because he had
not joined the union or signed a check-off card.
Analysis of the concepts of freedom of association and
disassociation must start with the purpose of the union under labour
legislation. The employer is backed by a concentration of capital.
Unless employees associate, the countervailing bargaining power of
the individual will be no match and the individuals in the unit will
suffer under contracts of adhesion with their employers. Solidarity
is essential for effective union action. Striking down the union shop
or a mandatory check-off under a constitutional freedom of
''non-association" will engender friction and dissent within the
unit. Employees could obtain the benefit of collective bargaining in
the unit without paying the price by union membership or dues.
Employees who pay this price would resent the free riders.
Solidarity could disappear, and the benefactor would be the
employer at the expense of every individual employee in the unit.
Freedom of "non-association" which impairs the effective
representation of all employees by the union is a mirage.
3. Freedoms of Thought, Belief,
Opinions, Expression andAssembly
Unions and employers may have different standards of protection of
freedom of speech under the Charter. Challenges to an employer's
freedom of speech generally arise under the unfair practice
provisions of the labour relations legislation, usually respecting
employer speech to employees during the union's organizing
campaign. The Charter applies to legislation, so the employer will
have the opportunity to challenge these legislative infringements on
its speech. Picketing is the form of union speech most frequently
challenged. Restraint upon picketing is often authorized by the
common law of tort. The Charter may not apply to the common
law, and the union may not be able to take full advantage of the
guarantee of free speech in order to protect its picketing activity.
The applicability of the Charterto common law may well be tested
in the picketing context.
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Free speech is meant to permit appeal to reason, so that the
interlocutor may assess the information and determine a course of
action. Such free speech by employer or union should be protected,
to the extent of the Charter's application. The Constitution should
not protect communication which exceeds an appeal to reason, but
contains an express or an implied threat. The difficulty is to
determine which conduct contains implied threats or innuendo
beyond communication of fact, opinion and appeal to reason.
Employer speech to employees during a union organization
campaign may easily contain an implied threat of repercussion for
supporting the union. The threat need not be expressed. The
employees know that the employer does not want the union. The
employer may frame its words in the form of a "prediction" of
consequences rather than a threat. In form, the employer's speech is
unimpeachable, but the employee gets the message. This may affect
the supposed free will of the employee and his decision whether to
vote for the union.
The labour relations boards have devised various tests to govern
employer free speech. The standards of review have ebbed and
flowed from time to time with the prevailing attitudes towards
unions. There have been various formulations, such as the "captive
audience" and "laboratory conditions" doctrines, requirements of
equal access to the employees by union and employer, and
prohibitions against speech by either union or employer within a
specified period before the representation vote. Generally,
however, a careful employer with good legal advice may craft his
words so that his speech will not be an unfair practice. Latent threats
and silent assumptions are difficult to establish by evidence.
The ideal would be to give the union and employer equal
opportunity to appeal to the reason of employees, with the
employees free to decide whether to listen. The speech should
contain only accurate information, and the representation vote
reflect purely the free will of the employees in the unit. This speech
would be "free" and protected by the Charter.Determinations can
only be made on a case-by-case and factual basis, and the board or
court would review the substance of the speech not the form.
Employer free speech bears interesting comparison to union free
speech in the form of picketing. Picketing may have different
purposes. Some picketing is intended to be solely informational, to
communicate facts to anyone who may read the placard. Other
picketing may be for the purpose of placing economic pressure upon
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the person who is picketed. In the latter case, the pickets impliedly
communicate that individuals are requested not to cross the picket
lines. This is the real message, and the words on the placard are
incidental.
It is tempting to say that this message is an implied threat
exceeding the bounds of protected speech. This is not necessarily
correct. The message received by the person who approached the
picket line might be: This union wishes to place economic pressure
upon the person who is picketed. I also belong to a union, or I
support union objectives. Union objectives, either mine or theirs,
succeed only by solidarity against the countervailing economic
power of the employer. So I will maintain solidarity and I will not
cross the picket line, because I agree with the principle and perhaps
these persons will return the favour when my union is on strike and I
am on the picket line.
The message appeals to the reason of the recipient, who decides
not to cross the picket line of his own free will, either because he
believes in the principles of solidarity or feels that solidarity may in
the future benefit him reciprocally.
Picketing may well contain implied threats of violence or
repercussion. Such activity would not be protected free speech. But,
as with the employer speech discussed above, each case should
depend upon the circumstances. The question should be whether the
message interfered with the free will of the recipient. This is largely
a question of fact. The courts have often treated the question as one
of law, for instance stating that certain types of picketing are per se
illegal, whatever the message communicated and the state of mind
of the recipient. To the extent that the Charterapplies to picketing,
it may be that in certain circumstances unions will attempt to justify
as free speech picketing which to date has been presumptively
illegal.
Another consequence of the Charter might be to narrow the
breadth of injunctions issued to restrain picketing. At present, once
the employer shows illegal activity separable from the picketing, the
court may enjoin both the activity and the picketing itself. If the free
speech component of picketing is protected under the Charterthen
at least in cases where the illegal activity and the picketing are
separable, the courts might issue "bullet" injunctions restraining
the illegal acts, but not the protected free speech component. The
Ontario Divisional Court has ruled that, even when a prior restraint
of free expression is justified under Section 1 of the Charter, the
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restraint will be invalid unless the standards for the exercise of the
restraint are prescribed by law. 27 This principle might narrow the
wording of injunctions against picketing protected as free speech.
To the extent that picketing is free expression guaranteed by the
Charter, the courts will be required to resolve conflicts between the
freedom of expression of the employees and the union and the
property rights of the employer. Free speech might justify the union
in soliciting union membership among employees, but the question
will remain whether the union may require the employer to give
access to the employer's premises for this purpose. Property rights
in the United States are constitutionally protected under the 5th
Amendment, which prohibits deprivation of property without due
process of law, and which applies to the states through the 14th
Amendment. The Canadian Charter pointedly omits reference to
property rights, and s. 7 does not guarantee fundamental justice
before an individual may be deprived of property. It may be,
therefore, that constitutionally protected free speech will have
greater prevalence over property rights in Canada than in the United
States.
The issue has come to a head in cases which involved picketing
on quasi-public property, such as shopping centres. These are
privately owned properties given to public access. The American
courts have differed in their assessment of the balance between
protected free speech and protected property rights. 2 8 The Supreme
Court of Canada has expressed reluctance to consider the broad
social and economic issues of this question in the absence of
constitutionally entrenched guidelines. 29
Freedom of political belief probably will be protected more
meticulously by the Charter than non-political modes of speech.
The American courts have generally held that the union may not,
against the will of an individual employee, use his contributions
under a compulsory checkoff to support political or ideological
campaigns unrelated to negotiation or enforcement of the collective
agreement. 30 The Canadian courts have not considered this question
27. Re Ontario Film and Video Application Society and Ontario Board of
Censors(O. Div. Cf), March 25, 1983.
28. Amalgamated Food Employees Union, Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza Inc.
(1968), 391 U.S. 308;Lloyd CorporationLtd. v. Tanner(1972), 407 U.S. 551.
29. Harrisonv. Carswell (1975), 5 N.R. 523 (S.C.C.) at 529-31.
30. IMA v. Street (1961), 367 U.S. 740; Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ. (1977),
431 U.S. 209.
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in a constitutional context, although the Supreme Court of Canada
has upheld provincial legislation which prohibits political contributions by unions. 3 ' This case might well be decided differently under
the Charter. An individual employee might be able to prevent a
union from spending the employee's contributions for political
purposes with which the employee disagrees. But, when there is no
question of dissent by an employee, it may be doubted whether
legislation may prevent a union from making political contributions
in the face of the guarantees of freedom of political belief and
expression in the Charter.
Political expression by public servants should have constitutional
implications under the guarantee of freedom of thought and
expression. The American courts have approached this question
from different angles, with varying results. The courts have upheld
the Hatch Act which restricts partisan political activity by federal
public servants. 32 On the other hand, the courts have held that a
government may not condition employment upon the waiver by an
employee of his constitutional rights. So, public employees who are
dismissed for publicly criticizing the government have successfully
challenged their dismissals on constitutional grounds. 33 Finally, the
American courts have held that dismissal of public employees for
reasons of political affiliation is an unconstitutional interference
with the rights of those employees to freedom of political thought
and expression. Generally, patronage dismissals are justified only
when the employer can demonstrate some rational relationship
between the functions of the job and the political beliefs of the
employee.34
There are competing interests involved in determining the extent
of a public servant's free speech on a political question. In one
sense, he should have the same freedom to speak as any other
individual whose rights are guaranteed by the Charter. The Charter
applies specifically to governments, and only indirectly under a
31. Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers International Union Local No. 16-601 v.
Imperial OilLimited, [1963] S.C.R. 584.
32. Union Public Workers v. Mitchell (1947), 330 U.S. 75; Civil Service Comm.
v. NationalAssoc. of Letter Carriers(1973), 414 U.S. 548.
33. Keyishian v. Board of Regents (1967), 385 U.S. 589; Pickering v. Bd. of
Education (1968), 391 U.S. 563; Perry v. Sindermann (1972), 408 U.S. 593; Mt.
Healthy City School DistrictBd. of Educ. v. Doyle (1977), 429 U.S. 274; Givhan
v. Western Line Cons. School District (1979), 439 U.S. 410.
34. Elrod v. Burns (1976), 427 U.S. 347; Branti v. Finkel (1980), 100 S. Ct.

1287.
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statute to the private sector. So, it may be argued that the actions of
the government employer are subject to special constitutional
scrutiny. On the other hand, criticism by government representatives of the policies that the government is elected to implement
may to some extent undermine the democratic ideal established in s.
1 of the Charter.
Freedom of speech may have special significance to employees
for whom speech is a function of the job. The media, for example,
are expressly included in the guarantee of free expression. Persons
in the teaching profession cherish academic freedom. The courts
may one day have to determine the extent to which government
employers or private parties under collective bargaining statutes
may interfere with the speech of such employees.
4. Mobility
Section 6 of the Charter guarantees to every individual the right to
move to any province and pursue the gaining of a livelihood in any
province, subject only to the laws of general application except
those which discriminate primarily on the basis of province of
present or previous residence. This might jeopardize the provisions
of certain civil service statutes which give preference to provincial
residents, unless these are justified under s. 6(4) as economic
affirmative action for provinces where the rate of employment is
below the national average. If collective bargaining in the private
sector is affected by the Charter by virtue of the exclusive
representation granted in trade union legislation, then s. 6 might
adversely affect hiring practices established under certain collective
agreements.
This could have its greatest impact on collective agreements with
province-wide units and hiring hall systems. In the construction
industry, the province is divided into sectors and employers'
associations are accredited to bargain with the unions representing
the trades. Generally, construction employers obtain employees
from lists kept by the unions. Usually there is one list for each local.
The union constitutions may provide for transfer of an employee
from one local to another if the employee obtains a working permit
from his new local. Without the union's permission, the employee
will not be able to practice his trade in the new local. Even if the
employee is admitted, the union locals would not dovetail their lists
in order of seniority and the transferred employees would appear on
the bottom of the list.
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Work in the construction industry is transient and intermittent.
The hiring hall system has a tendency to inhibit inter-local mobility
by construction workers. There may be a court challenge under s. 6
by a tradesman who wishes to move to a new province or local,
cannot obtain a working permit, and is unable to practice his trade in
his new province. The trade union legislation is of general
application under s. 6 (3 ) (a), but the collective agreement authorized
by the legislation may inhibit the trademan's mobility.
The Ontario Court of Appeal has held that the right to pursue a
livelihood in s.6(l) (b) applies not only to persons moving to a
province, but also to persons remaining in their province of
origin. 35 A plenary right to seek employment, subject only to the
exceptions in sections 6(3), 6(4) and 1, may have a significant
impact on the labour relations.
5. Equality under Law
Section 15(1) guarantees equality before and under the law and
equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination. As always, the first question will be whether this provision
applies to the challenged action. The provision should apply to
public sector employers. In the private sector, it may again be
argued that a collective agreement may bind an employee against
his will, only because of the exclusive bargaining representation
granted to the union by the trade union legislation. So, the equality
provision may apply to the terms and conditions of employment of
bargaining units in the private sector.
Perhaps the courts' most difficult task under the Charter will be
the definition of the ambit of equal protection under s. 15(1). The
listed classifications, race, sex, and age, etc. are deemed by the
constitution to be inherently irrational. Yet there will be occasions
where discrimination on these bases will be justified. A minimum
age for obtaining a driver's license will always be legitimate,
s. 15(1) notwithstanding.
Section 15 prohibits all "discrimination"
and denial of
"equality" before and under the law. Total equality is a chimera.
Individuals have personal differences, which justify different
treatment. A blind person needs training in braille, while a deaf
person needs training in sign language. A cripple needs crutches,
while an illiterate needs education. Discriminatory treatment may
35. Re. Skapinker (O.C.A.), January 27, 1983.
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be justified according to the different characteristics of the
individual. A court determining which classifications are or are not
justified will have few objective standards to guide its decision.
Essentially, the court will decide what is right and what is wrong.
Several American courts have struck down laws for denial of
equal protection when the classification in the law is not rationally
related to what the court feels to be the object of the legislation. A
provision stating that only veterans with an honourable discharge
could be employed by municipal government was held to be an
irrational classification and denial of equal protection. 3 6 Dismissal
of a government employee for unwed parenthood was similarly
invalid. 37 Mandatory maternity ledre at a specified month of
pregnancy has been held to be an irrational denial of equal
protection because the commencement of the leave was not related
to the needs or safety of the individual employees. 3 8 Denial of
access by resident aliens to examinations for civil service
employment has been struck down on the same basis.3 9
To strike down a provision in the statute because it is not
rationally related to the legislative purpose is to find that the
legislature did not mean what it said. The alternative is for the court
to apply reasonable standards outside the legislation in order to
review its substance. In either case, the court has little guidance.
The courts may be reluctant to act under s. 15(1) in the absence of
one of the specified forms of prohibited discrimination.
Presumably, if a court is satisfied that a public employee is
dismissed for arbitrary or irrational reasons, on whatever definition
of equal protection is adopted, the employee will have a
constitutional remedy. The same result might be obtained in the
private sector, if the employee is denied equal protection because of
the exclusive bargaining apparatus of trade union legislation. In
Bhadauriav. Seneca College40 the Supreme Court of Canada held
that human rights legislation ousted any common law tort of
discrimination. It may be that the employee will now have a
constitutional remedy under s.24(l) which will provide similar
results to those sought by the plaintiff in Bhadauria.
36. Thompson v. Gallagher(1973), 489 F. 2d 443 (5th Cir).
37. Andrews v. Drew Municipal Separate School District (1975), 507 F. 2d 511
(5th Cir.).
38. Cleveland Boardof Education v. LaFleur(1974), 414 U.S. 632.
39. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong (1976), 426 U.S. 88.
40. (1981), 37N.R. 455 (S.C.C.).
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There are several areas where litigation may be anticipated.
Denial of the right to bargain collectively to certain vocations might
deny equal protection unless there is a rational basis for the
distinction between these employees and others subject to the trade
union act. In The Ontario Human Rights Commission v. The
Borough of Etobicoke,41 the Supreme Court of Canada held that a
mandatory requirement provision in a collective agreement violated
the prohibition against discrimination on the basis of age in The
Ontario Human Rights Code. 42 It may be that the similar
prohibition in s. 15(l) will invalidate mandatory retirement ages in
public service statutes and collective agreements and perhaps in
private collective agreements if the Charter applies to the private
sector.
Fringe benefits may be another focus of litigation. If an employer
appropriates equal monies for fringe benefit contributions for male
and female employees, either women will be denied pregnancy
leave, or they will have pregnancy leave with reduced employer
contributions for other benefits. Similarly, if an employer makes
equal pension contributions for male and female employees, the
annuity purchased on retirement will give the male employee a
greater monthly pension benefit than the female employee. This is
because female employees have a higher average life expectancy.
This offers no solace to the individual female who receives a lower
pension benefit than her male colleague, but dies before the female
average expectancy. In cases like these, the courts will have to
determine whether inherent differences in the classification justify
discriminatory treatment.
In 1979 the Nova Scotia Legislature added to the Trade Union
Act 4 3 s.24A, which provides that the appropriate bargaining unit
respecting an employer who has two or more interdependent
manufacturing locations will consist of all employees at all the
locations. This severely inhibits the effectiveness of a union's
organizing campaign. Other employees are subject to the normal
rules of unit determination, where interdependence of employer
locations is one fact, which may or may not be determinative
depending on all the circumstances of the case. A reasonable
argument could be made that s.24A denies equal protection of the
41. (1982), 40 N.R. 159 (S.C.C.).
42. R.S.O. 1980, c. 340, s.4(1) (g).
43. S.N.S. 1972, c.19.
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law within the meaning of s. 15(1) of the Charter. For employers
other than those who have two or more manufacturing locations,
interdependence is only one of many factors. For manufacturing
companies, interdependence is determinative. The question is
whether the discrimination between employees of companies with
two or more manufacturing outlets and other employees is
sufficiently rational to satisfy whatever tests of equal protection the
courts adopt under s. 15(l). Possible bases for challenge to s.24A
include the following:
(i) Deemed units for interdependent locations do not apply to
interdependent locations outside the manufacturing industry.
There may be interdependent outlets of an employer in the
service industries. The employer may have a vertically integrated
operation, for example, with one location involved in resource
extraction, another location in manufacturing, another for
transportation, and another for administration. Despite the
interdependence, s.24A would not apply.
(ii) There is almost always interdependence of functions within
the business of an employer, even if there is only one location. It
is quite normal to separate the units. In a single plant,
administration and production are interdependent, but separate
units are normal and appropriate. On a construction site, the
trades are interdependent with separate bargaining units. Yet,
s.24A does not apply.
(iii) Section 24(6) excludes the application of the joint unit
concept from interdependent manufacturing employers for whom
the union has already been certified or voluntarily recognized.
These employers might do the same business as companies
subject to s.24A, but their employees are treated differently for
purposes of unit determination.
(iv) Employers not subject to s.24A have their units
determined according to all the circumstances of the case. If
interdependence is considered by the Board to be of predominant
importance, then interdependence would determine the appropriate unit. If not, then interdependence would not determine the
appropriate unit. The effect of s.24A is to exclude this discretion
from the Board. Even in cases where interdependence is
outweighed by the merits of other factors, the employees of an
employer subject to s.24A will be required to organize the
interdependent unit.
It may be that s.24A will one day be challenged under s. 15(1) of the
Charter. Section 15 does not come into force until 1985 and, of
course, the Nova Scotia Legislature may always act under s.33 to
expressly exclude the application of the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms to s.24A of the Trade Union Act.
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6. Rule ofLaw
The preamble of the Charterrecognizes the "rule of law."
In Crevierv. Attorney General of Quebec4 4 the Supreme Court of
Canada held that a privative clause which excluded judicial review
by the provincially appointed tribunal on grounds of jurisdiction
would violate s.96 of the British North America Act (hereafter
B.N.A. Act):
It cannot be left to a provincial statutory tribunal, in the face of
s.96, to determine
the limits of its own jurisdiction without
45
appeal or review.
In Re MacLeod 46 Chief Justice Laskin held that there could be no
curial deference to an arbitrator on questions of statutory
interpretation.
These decisions rest on a foundation of the rule of law. Section 96
may be an awkward instrument to apply the principle. First, s.96
does not regulate the conduct of federally appointed administrative
tribunals. These should be subject to the rule of law no less than
provincial tribunals. Second, Crevier defines the ambit of
constitutionally protected review in terms of "jurisdiction." This is
a loaded word. Each case involves a chain of reasoning, and a
mistake of law anywhere along the chain will deprive the tribunal of
jurisdiction to go further. A court which hears the merits and denies
liability has no jurisdiction to award the plaintiff a remedy. Various
courts have described almost every conceivable type of error as an
error of "jurisdiction." The word "jurisdiction" gives the
semblance of deference while permitting an undeferential court to
conduct virtual appellate review.
If, as Crevier suggests, a standard of judicial review is
entrenched in the constitution, it may be preferable to draw the
power from the preambular recognition of the "rule of law" in the
Charter than from s.96. The principle would apply to federal as
well as provincial tribunals. The court could draw its standards of
review and deference from the generic principle of the rule of law,
and avoid the confusion which usually follows in the wake of the
word "jurisdiction".

44. (1981), 38 N.R. 541 (S.C.C.).
45. Id., at 559.
46. (1974), 2 N.R. 443 at 449 (S.C.C.).
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7. FundamentalJustice
Section 7 guarantees the right not to be deprived of "life, liberty
and security of the person" without "fundamental justice".
Section 7 appears under the heading "Legal Rights" along with a
list of other rights applicable to criminal procedure. The collocation
of "liberty" with "life" and "security of the person" might
indicate that the liberty guaranteed by s.7 is freedom from bodily
restraint by incarceration. If this is the meaning of "liberty", then
the guarantee of fundamental justice should have little bearing on
labour law.
The American courts have adopted a much broader definition of
"liberty". The 5th Amendment prohibits denial of life, "liberty"
or property without due process of law. In Boiling v. Sharpe, 7 the
Supreme Court stated:
Although the Court has not assumed to define 'liberty' with great
precision, that term is not confined to mere freedom from bodily
restraint. Liberty under the law extends to the full range of
conduct which the individual is free to pursue, and 4it8 cannot be
restricted except for a proper governmental objective.
Other cases have held that "liberty" includes freedom to work or
to seek employment. A dismissal of a public employee which
impairs the employee's reputation and interferes with his freedom to
obtain new employment might interfere with his "liberty" and
49
invoke the due process guarantee.
The antecedents of the due process/fundamental justice concept
might also justify a broad definition of "liberty". The concept in
Anglo-Saxon law derives from Article 29 of the Magna Carta
(1225) which stated that "no free man shall be taken or imprisoned
or deprived of his freehold or his liberties or free customs, or
outlawed or exiled, or in any manner destroyed, nor shall we come
upon him or send against him, except by a legal judgment of his
peers or by the law of the land." The freedoms referred to include
much more than mere absence of bodily restraint. In Quinn v.
Leathem, 50 Lord Lindley stated:
As to the plaintiff's rights. He had the ordinary rights of a British
subject. He was at liberty to earn his own living in his own way,
47. (1954), 347 U.S. 497.
48. Id., at 499-500.
49. Board of Regents v. Roth (1972), 408 U.S. 564; see also Perry v. Sinderman
(1972), 408 U.S. 593.
50. [1901] A.C. 495.
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provided he did not violate some special law prohibiting him
from so doing, and provided he did not infringe the rights of other
people. This liberty involved liberty to deal with other persons
who were willing to deal with him. This liberty is a right
recognized by law; its correlative is the general duty of everyone
not to prevent the free exercise of this liberty, except so far as his
own liberty of action may justify him in so doing. But a person's
liberty or right to deal with others is nugatory, unless they are at
liberty to deal with him if they choose to do so. Any interference
with their liberty to deal with him affects him. 51
This passage was quoted by Locke, J., concurring, in Orchard v.
2
Tunney. 5
If the courts adopt a broad definition of "liberty" then s.7 may
afford a general standard of procedural fairness. The broader the
reach of fundamental justice, the more important it will be that the
courts define the standards of fundamental justice flexibly according
to the circumstances of the individual cases. To demand more
procedural safeguards than practical is to effect substantive review
in disguise. This was one of the reasons for the emergence of
substantive due process which has caused difficulties in the United
States.
The Supreme Court has in recent cases developed a broad and
flexible definition of procedural fairness in administrative law.5 3
Fairness is required whether the function is quasi-judicial or
administrative. The standards of fairness differ with the circumstances of each case. In Kane v The Board of Governors of the
University ofBritish Columbia5 4 the Supreme Court stated: "A high
standard of justice is required when the right to continue one's
profession or employment is at stake." 5 5
On the basis of the Supreme Court's treatment of administrative
procedural fairness in recent decisions, there may be a reasonable
expectation that the Court will interpret "liberty" broadly in s.7.
Deprivation of the ability of free persons to exercise their will would
51. Id., at 534-35.
52. [1957] S.C.R. 536.
53. Martineau v. Matsqui InstitutionDisciplinaryBoard 119 (1979), 30 N.R. 119
(S.C.C.); Nicholson v. Haldimand-Norfolk Regional Board of Commissioners of
Police (1978), 23 N.R. 410 (S.C.C.); Inuit Tapiristatof Canada v. A.G. Canada
(1980), 33 N.R. 304 (S.C.C.); Homex Realty andDevelopment Co. Ltd. v. Village
of Wyoming (1980), 33 N.R. 475 (S.C.C.).
54. (1980), 31 N.R. 214 at 221 (S.C.C.).
55. Id., at 221.
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be subject to fundamental justice, interpreted flexibly according to
the circumstances of individual cases. If this approach is adopted,
then employers in the public sectors will be affected by the
requirement for fundamental justice. Dismissed public employees
might have a constitutional remedy analogous to the administrative
remedy fashioned in Nicholson. 56 Whether fundamental justice
would apply to labour relations in the private sector depends laregly
on whether the courts find that the Charter applies to the private
sector by means of the exclusive bargaining regime established by
trade union legislation.
The case law to date under section 7 has been inconclusive. The
courts have not defined "liberty". The New Brunswick Queen's
Bench has broadly defined "security of the person" to include
property rights, an interpretation not adopted by the New Brunswick
57
Court of Appeal.
"Substantive fundamental justice" has appeared under s.7 as did
"substantive due process" under the American Bill of Rights. The
British Columbia Court of Appeal has stated that s.7 not only
regulates procedure in adjudicatory tribunals but also invalidates
statutory provisions which, in the court's view, are fundamentally
unjust. 58 This approach could have wide implications. The courts
would pass upon the "justice" of a statute without objective
standards to guide their review. It may be argued, for example, that
a statutory wage freeze interferes with "liberty" to contract. If the
court finds this to be fundamentally "unjust", the freeze may
violate section 7. The Supreme Court of Canada may eventually
consider the American experience with "substantive due process"
and rule that s.7 guarantees only procedural fairness. 59

56. Supra note 53.
57. The Queen v. Fishermen's Wharf Ltd (1982), 135 D.L.R. (3d) 307
(N.B.Q.B.), affirmed for other reasons (N.B.C.A.), Dec. 31, 1982. See The
Queen v. EasterbrooksPontiacBuick Ltd (N.B.C.A.), December 31, 1982.
58. Re. Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.C.A.), Feb 3, 1983. To the
same effectR. v. Campagna (1982), 70 C.C.C. (2d) 236 (B.C. Prov. Ct.). Contra:
R. v. Duff (1982), 17 MV.R. 225 (B.C. Prov. Ct.); Re. Jamieson (1982), 70
C.C.C. (2d) 430 (Q.S.C.).
59. Eg. see Curr v. The Queen (1972), 26 D.L.R. (3d) 603 (S.C.C.) at 615 where
Laskin J. described American "economic due process" as a "bog of legislative
policy making" by the courts.
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8. Waiver or Contractingout of Charter
Whether an employee may contract out of or waive his guaranteed
rights under the Charteris an especially interesting question under a
collective bargaining regime. A collective agreement may contain
terms which inhibit the employee's exercise of his guaranteed
freedoms, or which if embodied in legislation would deny the
employee equal protection of the law. A dismissed employee may
be unable to grieve because the union has decided not to support the
grievance or has missed the time limit and deprived the arbitrator of
jurisdiction. The courts generally say that an employee under a
collective agreement has no jurisdiction to commence an individual
lawsuit. Such an employee may be deprived of his job without
"fundamental justice".
If the employee personally signed a contract which authorized a
deprivation of his guaranteed rights or freedoms, then there may be
a basis for saying that he waived his constitutional guarantees. A
collective agreement, however, may be imposed upon the employee
through the will of the majority in the unit and against the wishes of
the employee affected. The Constitution guarantees these rights and
freedoms to individuals, and through the collective bargaining
regime, the individual may be deprived of a right or freedom
without his assent.
The American courts have on occasion stated that a public
employee may not be dismissed for doing something which is
protected by the Constitution, and that the government employer
may not require the employee as a condition of employment to
waive his constitutional rights. In The Ontario Human Rights
Commission v. The Borough of Etobicoke60 the Supreme Court of
Canada held that the prohibition against discrimination on the basis
of age in the Human Rights Code of Ontario6 1 prevailed over a
provision in the collective agreement which authorized mandatory
retirement. The court stated:
Although the Code contains no explicit restriction on such
contracting out, it is nevertheless a public statute and it
constitutes public policy in Ontario as appears from a reading of
the statute itself and as declared in the preamble. It is clear from
the authorities, both in Canada and in England, that parties are
not competent to contract themselves out of the provisions of
60. (1982), 40 N.R. 159 (S.C.C.).
61. R.S.O. 1980, c. 3 4 0, s. 4(1) (g).
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such enactments and that6contracts
having such effect are void, as
2
contrary to public policy.
If human rights in a statute prevail over the contract because of
public policy, then it may be presumed that the courts will restrict
contracting out or individual waiver of the rights and freedoms in
the Charter. This raises a number of questions. For instance, when
an employee is dismissed and his union refuses to take the grievance
or acts in an untimely fashion depriving the arbitrator of
jurisdiction, may the employee claim that he was deprived of his
liberty without fundamental justice and obtain a constitutional
remedy in court? When a collective agreement classifies employees
in an irrational manner which would deny equal protection of law if
placed in a statute, may the employee challenge the collective
agreement under the Charter?May an employee refuse to abide by
the union's security or other provisions of the collective agreement
because joining a union allegedly interferes with his freedom of
conscience, association, mobility or other guaranteed rights?
The Charterguarantees the rights and freedoms to individuals. A
collective bargaining regime by its nature subjects the interests of
the individual to the interest of the group. If the analysis stops here,
the two may be seen as antithetical. But the analysis should not stop
there. It should be recalled that the purpose of collective bargaining
is to protect the individual against the employer, and the mechanism
for protection is solidarity. The Chartershould not be interpreted to
weaken the common front of employees against the employer. This
should be left intact, but the constitutional guarantees should rather
be directed towards a duty of fair representation between the union
and employees.
9. Rights of IndividualEmployees
In the discussion of the application of the Charter to labour
relations, the recurrent theme has been that there is some
inconsistency between the position of the individual, whose rights
and freedoms are guaranteed in the Charter, and the rationale for
collective bargaining legislation, which subjects the individual to
the group in order to better protect the interests of all individual
employees against the employer. If a statute could not directly
withdraw rights or freedoms from employees without violating the
Charter, then it may strongly be argued that the trade union
62. (1982), 40 N.R. 159 (S.C.C.) at 170.
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legislation may not authorize exclusive bargaining representation
which leads to such deprivation against the will of the employee. To
permit employees to fully enforce all their individual rights, without
reference to the group concept represented by the union, could
seriously affect the solidarity needed for effective representation of
all individual employees against the employer. The best course
might be to draw by inference from the Charter a duty of fair
representation of the union towards the employee. The relationship
of the union plus employees against the employer would remain the
same. The interests of the individual against the union inter se
would have constitutional protection.
The American courts found a duty of fair representation by
inference from the labour legislation. There is a reasonable basis for
argument that had the duty of fair representation not been found to
exist in the statute, the labour legislation might have been
constitutionally suspect. Canadian legislation is generally based on
the same model as the American labour legislation. The crucial
factor is the exclusive bargaining representation further to the vote
and approval by a majority of employees in the unit. There is a
reasonable basis in Canada for argument that a duty of fair
63
representation should be inferred either from the labour legislation
or from the Charter. Otherwise, the subjection of the interest of the
individual to the group against the will of the individual might be
constitutionally suspect.
The American courts have held that an employee who suffered by
reason of a breach of the union's duty of fair representation may sue
the union or in certain circumstances sue the employer in court on
the merits of his claim." 4 Canadian courts have accorded the
6 5
employee some procedural rights to notice in arbitration.
Generally, however, the employee has no individual rights to
enforce the collective agreement in arbitration. The Courts usually
dismiss individual actions upon a collective agreement for want of
63. Eg. See The Queen v. EasterbrooksPontiacBuick Ltd (N.B.C.A.), December
31, 1982 where the Court applied s.26 of the Charter (preserving other rights not
mentioned in the Charter) to interpret a statute in a manner which would not impair
property rights.
64. Vaca v. Sipes (1966), 386 U.S. 1971; Steel v. Louisville & Nashville R.R.
(1944), 323 U.S. 192; Humphrey v. Moore (1964), 375 U.S. 335 at 343; Republic
Steel Corp. v. Maddox (1965), 3790 U.S. 650 at 653.
65. Re Hoogendoorn (1967), 65 D.L.R. (2d) 641 (S.C.C.); Re Bradley (1967), 63
D.L.R. (2d) 376 (O.C.A.).
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jurisdiction.6 6 The Canadian courts will probably be asked to
determine whether s.24(l) of the Charter gives jurisdiction to a
court to hear an action by an employee either against his union or on
the merits against his employer where the employee argues that
there has been a breach of the duty of fair representation, or that the
actions of the union or employer othewise denied the employee his
rights and freedoms guaranteed in the Charter.
The following might be an example of such an argument. The
Canadian courts have generally held that failure to follow the
grievance procedure in timely fashion deprives the arbitrator of
jurisdiction to hear the grievance. 67 So, the arbitrator will have no
jurisdiction, and the courts generally refuse to hear cases for the
enforcement of collective agreements. A dismissed employee would
be without a remedy. The employee might argue that this deprives
the employee of his "liberty" to be employed without "fundamental justice" as guaranteed by s.7. An employee in the private sector
would say that the Charterapplies to this action by virtue of s.32(1)
and the exclusive bargaining regime established under the trade
union legislation. The employee would claim his remedy in court
under s.24 of the Charter.
As with the implied duty of fair representation, the court might
deal with the above example of interpreting the legislation in order
to avoid a constitutional question. In McGavin ToastmasterLtd. v.
Ainscough68 the Supreme Court of Canada held that the collective
agreement is sui generis, and common law principles of contract are
generally excluded from interpretation of the collective agreement.
The court held that breach by one party of a provision of the
collective agreement did not "repudiate" the agreement, and did
not justify the refusal by the other party to abide by its terms. The
application of this reasoning to the "procedural bar" question might
mean that the failure by the union or employee to comply with the
procedural time limits in the grievance procedure does not exculpate
the employer from his own breach of the substantive provisions of
the agreement. Rather, the employer could claim a set-off for losses
66. Brunet v. General Motors of Canada Ltd. (1977), 13 N.R. 233 (S.C.C.);
Binder v. Halifax County Municipal School Board (1978), 84 D.L.R. (2d) 494
(N.S.S.C. A.D.).
67. Union CarbideCanadaLtd. v. Weiler (1968), 70 D.L.R. (2d) 333 (S.C.C.);
General Truck Drivers Union, Local 938 v. Hoar TransportCo. (1969), 4 D.L.R.
(3d) 449 (S.C.C.).
68. (1975), 54D.L.R. (3d) (S.C.C.).
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suffered as a result of prejudice from the untimely action.
Interpretation of the trade union legislation and collective agreement
in this manner would avoid the constitional question which might
otherwise arise.
IV. Summary
Probably the most important question in this subject will be whether
the courts apply the Charterto collective bargaining in the private
sector. Section 32(1) states that the Charter applies to legislation.
The collective bargaining regime which grants exclusive representation to a union supported by the majority of employees in the union
is a creature of legislation. This regime permits deprivation of rights
or freedoms of the individual in the name of group interest. The
Charterprotects the individual. So there is a basis for argument that
the Charterapplies to private sector collective bargaining.
If the courts adopt this reasoning, then the Charter may have
resounding implications for labour relations. In determining the
scope of these implications, the courts should keep in mind that the
legislative purpose of labour legislation is to protect the individual
employee through enforced solidarity against the employer. Labour
legislation does not exist to benefit unions, but to benefit individual
employees. If the courts keep this in mind, then the Chartermay be
interpreted not to limit the powers of the union against the
employer, but to provide to the employee a duty of fair
representation by his union. The duty of fair representation would
balance the group interest of all the individuals in solidarity against
the employer, and the individual interest of the employee to protect
his rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter.

